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Cameron Harer in this case was a

for the costs of
discretionary determination.

limits and legal standards defining that

It considered

discretion and made a reasoned decision within the scope of that discretion - that the
State had failed to carry its burden of proof to show that the restitution award it sought
was proper in light of all the relevant, statutorily-identified factors. Therefore, it denied
the State's request for restitution.
The State appealed, asserting that the district court established an additional
for the State to prove before it merits the restitution in such cases, thereby
excluding a particular subset of cases from the scope of the restitution statute. Since
the district court properly exercised

discretion in this case, this Court should affirm

court's
Alternatively, this

the district court's order denying the

request pursuant
restitution

the

of correct result, wrong reason. Since

included time

prosecutor spent working on a case which

was ultimately dismissed, and since the State failed to prove that there was an
agreement authorizing restitution for that time, the district court had no statutory
authority to award the restitution amount the State was requesting. Because the State
failed to meet its prima facie burden to show it was entitled to the restitution it claimed
under the statute, the district court order denying the State's motion was proper on this
alternative ground.

1

either of

this Court should

district court's

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In this case, Mr. Harer pied guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver
a controlled substance. (R., p.79.) The only term of the plea agreement expressed in
the appellate record is the statement in Mr. Harer's guilty plea questionnaire, that the
"State will rec[ommend] no more than retained jurisdiction." (R., p.69.) However, the
district court subsequently indicated there was a general agreement that Mr. Harer
would pay restitution, though "[t]here was no agreement as to . . . the amount of
restitution."

(R., p.102.)

Additionally, at the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor

dismissed another case pending against Mr. Harer (CR-2014-13437). 1 (See R., p.74.)
district court imposed a unified term of five years, with three years fixed, on
Mr. Harer, and it retained jurisdiction over the case. (R., p.80.) Mr. Harer successfully
completed a rider program during that period of retained jurisdiction, and the district
court subsequently suspended his sentence for a four-year period of probation.
(R., p.125.)
However, at the initial sentencing hearing, the prosecutor moved for a restitution
award of $410 dollars, $200 for the testing of substances in this case, and $210 for the
time spent prosecuting the case.

(Tr., p.3,

1-3.)

Harer objected

the $210

request for the prosecutor's time. (Tr., p.3, Ls.14-16.) He argued that the request for
restitution was not appropriate since the prosecutor's office was already properly

According to the online repository, CR-2014-13437 charged Mr. Harer with possession
of a controlled substance with a second-offense enhancement.
1

2

16-20.) He
in

investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) had also

Harer was

unemployed, and so, he "would require additional time in order to find a job to pay any
fines, fees, court costs, or restitution that may be ordered by the Court." (PSI, p.6.) 2
The district court ordered restitution for the $200 to which Mr. Harer had not objected,
along with $2,035.50 in other costs, fines, and fees. (Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.3;

see also

R., pp.80-81.) However, it requested briefing from the State in support of its request for

the remaining $210. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-11.)
The State's brief argued that the district court had the discretion to award the
requested restitution. (R., pp.86-92.) However, its request for restitution included an
accounting of the time spent on both CR-2014-12661 (the case currently on appeal) and
"CR-1

."

State's

(R., p.93.)

for restitution. (R., p. 105.)

In reaching that decision, the district court recognized:
this

[I.C. § 37-2732(k)] gives the Court discretion

is no question that
award the costs of

prosecution actually incurred, including the regular salaries of employees." (R., p.103.)
However, it also noted that such an award was discretionary, not mandatory.
(R., p.105.) Thus, it determined, "[t]he issue here is not whether the Court can award

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"CONFIDENTAIL CLERK'S CERTIFICATE HARER 43421." Included in this file are the
PSI report and all the documents attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider
staff, etc.).
2

3

costs of

of prosecution as restitution, but rather, whether it

as

1

no

§

in

discretion in that regard, the district court looked to the general restitution statute,
. § 19-5304, for guidance. (R., p.105.) It determined that it needed to consider '"the

amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the
court deems appropriate"' in deciding whether to grant the State's request for restitution.
(R., p.105 (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(7)).)
In considering those factors, the district court found that "[t]he State has made no
showing of economic loss.

The deputy prosecutor's salary would have been paid

whether or not work was done in this case." (R., p.105.) While it noted that, if the facts
a particular case merited an award of restitution for the costs of prosecution, it would
willing

order such

district court concluded the

of this case did

show such an order was merited. (R., p.105.)
Rather, the district court explained, it had already ordered Mr. Harer to pay
various fines, fees, and costs.

(R., p.105 (identifying costs totaling $1950); compare

R., pp.80-81 (ordering costs in the judgement of conviction totaling $2,235.50).)
Additionally, it explained the costs for which the State was seeking restitution were "the
hourly rate and length of time incurred by the deputy prosecutor in doing her job on this
case." (R., p.105.) It pointed out that those were simply part of the general costs of
maintaining the justice system and, in cases such as Mr. Harer's, those general costs
were more appropriately borne by the government. (R., pp.105-06.) Thus, it concluded,

4

sees no reason as

no

case

case is

criminal case." (R., p.106.) Thus, based on its evaluation of the facts of the
the relevant legal standards, and the State's failure to present sufficient evidence
to justify its request, the district court denied the State's motion for that restitution.
(R., p.106.)
The State filed a timely appeal from that decision. (R., pp.108-10.) On appeal, it
argued that the district court had improperly added an element of proof - that the case
was different than the standard criminal case

and thereby, improperly limited

discretion by excluding a subset of the cases in which such restitution awards could,
within the district court's discretion, be awarded. (App. Br., pp.4-6.)

5

ISSUE
on

as

err
it
is
recover
of prosecution under I
§ 37-2732(k) only if the
suffers "economic loss," which it does not suffer in "routine drug cases"?
(App. Br., p.2.)
The State's articulation of this issue is unduly narrow.

Therefore, Mr. Harer

would rephrase the issues this way:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied the State's motion
for restitution for the costs of prosecution?

6

'The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is
within the district court's discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth
in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599,602 (2011). While
the restitution claim in this case was made under I.C. § 37-2732(k), "[s]ince I.C. § 372732(k) is short on

guidance regarding the nature of a restitution award or the

procedure to obtain such an award, we find guidance in the general restitution statute,
I.C. § 19-5304." State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258 (2012). The State bears the
burden to prove that restitution is proper, in that "the expenses were reasonable and
necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct." State v. Card,

1

Idaho 111, 11

5 (Ct. App. 2008).

When the appellate courts review such exercises of discretion, they
"( 1) whether the
court acted within

court rightly

consider:

the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether

boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any

legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason."

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)

(internal quotation omitted). The State, as the party challenging the restitution order,
bears the burden of showing a clear abuse of the district court's discretion.

Cf.

State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) ("Error will not be presumed on appeal, but
must be affirmatively shown in the record. The appellant has the burden of providing an

7

on appeal .

.").

district court's

In

if

are

1
The District Court's Decision To Deny The State's Request For Restitution
Constituted A Proper Exercise Of Its Discretion
In this case, the district court properly exercised its discretion, determining that,
when all the relevant factors were considered, the State had failed to carry its prima
facie burden to show that the restitution it claimed was reasonable and necessary to
address an actual loss caused by the defendant's criminal conduct

(R, pp.103-06.)

The State's attempts to transform the district court's analysis such that, as the State
claims, the statute would "not apply[) to 'routine' drug cases" (App. Br., pp.4-6),
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the district court's analysis.
When the district court's decision is analyzed through the proper standard of
was not categorically excluding this sort of

it

restitution in "routine" cases, but merely holding the State to

burden of proof. Since it

that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to show the restitution it
claimed was necessary to address an economic loss caused by the conduct for which
Mr. Harer was convicted in light of all the statutory factors, the district court properly
exercised its discretion to deny that claim for restitution. As such, the State's argument
should be rejected and this Court should affirm the order denying the State's request for
restitution.

8

1.

in

[I

is no

§

2732(k)] gives the Court the discretion to award the costs of prosecution actually
incurred, including regular salaries of employees." (R., p.103.) Thus, it described the
question it was deciding as:

"whether it should award costs of prosecution as

restitution." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, after examining the precedent
upon which the State based its claim, the district court explained, "nothing in Weaver{3]
or Cardoza[ 4 ] mandates an award for the costs of prosecution.
for the trial court." (R., p.105.) Similarly, it noted, "[i]f

It is a discretionary

Legislature had wanted

the costs of prosecution to be awarded in every drug case, the Legislature could have
the award of costs mandatory rather than discretionary," but it had not done so.
, p.106.) The district court's determination that this issue is within its discretion is
regarding

to

restitution, and in what amount, is

the district court's discretion." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602.
Finally, the district court's decision demonstrated it was exercising its discretion:
"This Court is not opposed to awarding

of prosecution as restitution in appropriate

cases and under appropriate facts and circumstances." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).)
This also demonstrates that the district court did not, as the State contends,

categorically exclude a certain subset of cases (the "routine" cases) from the scope of
I.C. § 37-2732(k). (See App. Br., pp.4-6.) All the district court required is that the State

3
4

State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied.
State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889 (Ct. App. 2014).
9

proving

and circumstances

case justify
j

ng

p.1

was
its decision passes the first prong of the Hedger test for appropriate exercise
its discretion.

The District Court Acted Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion
And Consistent With Legal Standards Applicable To That Decision
The district court's determination that whether or not to award restitution is within
its discretion also identifies the outer boundaries of its discretion, in that it could award
the entire amount requested, or it could deny the entire request.

Within those

boundaries, the district court identified legal standards applicable to its decision:
"Because I.C. § 37-2732(k) contains no provisions concerning the nature of a restitution
or the proceedings to obtain that award, courts are guided by reference to the
restitution

I.C. § 19-5304." (R.,

105.) The Idaho Supreme Court has

this procedure is proper. Gomez, 153 Idaho at 258.
Idaho Code § 19-5304(7) identifies several factors relevant to the district court's
discretionary decision to award or not award restitution in a particular case:
The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of
such restitution, shall consider [1] the amount of economic loss sustained
by the victim as a result of the offense, [2] the financial resources, needs
and earning ability of the defendant, and [3] such other factors as the
court deems appropriate. The immediate inability to pay restitution by a
defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution.
I.C. § 19-5304(7). Additionally, restitution awards under I.C. § 19-5304 must address
an economic loss the victim has actually suffered as the result of the conduct for which
the defendant was actually convicted. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App.

10

in

s:

case is

as a matter of

district court
the loss the

case."

on

or

that there was no causal connection

and the conduct

had been

convicted. (See R., p.105.) As such, the State failed to carry its prima facie burden of
proof, and so, denying the motion was the appropriate result according to the relevant
legal standards.
Fundamentally though, what the district court's analysis recognized, and what the
State's argument on appeal fails to appreciate, is that there are other factors besides
simple fact that a loss occurred which play into the discretionary decision of whether
to order restitution.
restitution

(Compare R., pp.5-6; with App. Br., pp.4-6.)

After all, "[t]he

is not so broad, however, as to authorize compensation for every
or
146 Idaho
call

as a

114 (emphasis from original). Thus, as the district court
it to determine, within

it should

restitution. (R., p.105.)
In ignoring this fact,
decision on appeal.
mean that
the record.

State's asks this Court to reverse the district court's

(App. Br., p.7.)

Granting the remedy the State requests would

district court should have granted the motion based on the evidence in
That request is improper since "[w]hen a discretionary ruling has been

tainted by legal or factual error, we ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter
for a new; error-free discretionary determination by the trial court." State v. Upton, 127

11

(Ct. App. 1995).

requested remedy 1s

The reason the

case is

the

it

in

it

in

should have determined the amount of loss sustained, then ordered the defendant
pay that amount (See App. Br., pp.4-7.)
The Court of Appeals has already rejected such a result:

"we cannot say [the

statute] wholly disregards reasonableness and necessity as factors shaping a court's
restitution order." In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 283-84 (Ct. App. 2008). Since the State's
argument in this case promotes that already-rejected perspective, in contravention of
the plain language of the relevant statutes, this Court should reject that argument and
uphold the full scope of the district court's discretion, as defined by the relative statutes.
Since the district court properly recognized the outer boundaries of its discretion
consistent with the legal standards therein, its decision satisfies the second
of the Hedger test.

3.

The District Court's Decision Constituted An Exercise Of Reason

The district court's discussion of this issue reveals that it gave reasoned
consideration to each of the relevant statutory factors in its decision to deny the State's
request for restitution.

(R., pp.103-06.)

For example, the district court's discussion

about the general expenses of maintaining the judicial system is directed at the first of

the statutory factors - the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim (here, the
State). (See R., pp.105-06.) The point the district court was making is the claimed loss
was relatively minor - these are just the costs which necessarily exist from having a
justice system, not some extreme expenditure of resources.

12

As trial counsel pointed

h

is

on

cases ....

1

0 .... "

Tr., p.4, Ls.4-5.)

In support of that determination, the district court relied on the

Supreme

decision in State v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665 (1968). (R., p.106.) The Hanson
Court was evaluating the application of the since-repealed I.C. § 19-4703, which
provided that, in any case where the defendant was convicted in a jury trial, '"the costs
thereof shall be paid"' by the defendant.

See Hanson, 92 Idaho at 668 n.1 (quoting

§ 19-4703). The Idaho Supreme Court joined with a number of other states to hold
that such costs "are a general expense of maintaining the system of courts and the
administration of justice, and that such costs are more properly an ordinary burden of
government" Id. at 668-69.
While not a

the

I.C. §

is

in Hanson is

a relatively minor amount
in

it

general

incurred

, the

the defendant to pay that cost is lessened. Cf State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37
(Ct. App. 2002) (noting that I. C. § 19-5304(7) generally favors a policy of full
of victims, and so, necessarily

that

cases

that policy will not be appropriately enforced). Thus, the district court's consideration of
that factor, as expressly required by I.C. § 19-5304(7), is not, as the State claims,
adding an additional factor for the State to prove. (See App. Br., pp.4-6.) Rather, it is

13

engaging in a reasoned examination of one

an

in

decision is an abuse of its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Windom, 150 Idaho
881 (2011) (explaining that, even where "reasonable minds may differ as to the
'rightness' of the district court's factual conclusions ... it is manifest that the district
court's sentence was the product of reason," and so, the defendant had failed to show
decision constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion).
The district court's ultimate decision to deny the restitution request is further
supported by its consideration of the second statutorily-identified factor -

the

defendant's financial situation. While this factor is by no means dispositive, the statute
expressly calls for it to be considered within the totality of the district court's evaluation
of the issue. I.C. § 19-5304(7) ("The court ... shall consider ... the financial resources,
and earning ability of the defendant"). In this regard, the district court pointed out
it had already ordered Mr. Harer to pay $1,950 in fines, costs, and other restitution.

(R, p.105.) The district court did not include its order for Mr. Harer to pay $285.50 in
statutory fees in that calculation, but with those fees added in, Mr. Harer was already
obligated to pay $2,235.50.

(See R., pp.80-81.)

The PSI added that, because

Mr. Harer was unemployed, he "would require additional time in order to find a job to
, fees, court

or restitution that may be ordered by the Court."

(PSI, p.6.) Trial counsel effectively explained the impact of these facts in this case,
pointing out that ordering the restitution for these particular costs of prosecution is part
of:

14

they
back out of the retained jurisdiction
The prosecutor's office isn't going to miss out on another $210, but
it may be that cutting down n the financial strain -- when they're already
paying for costs and fees and costs of supervision and treatment and
housing when they get back out, that this [restitution] could be the straw
that breaks the camel's back.
(Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.3.) Thus, the second factor identified in I.C. § 19-5304(7) weighs
heavily against awarding the claimed restitution, particularly when, as the district court
determined, the amount of the loss claimed was relatively minor.
The district court's discussion of this factor echoes trial counsel's argument. For
example, the district court adopted the assertion that it should consider not awarding the
required restitution in light of all the other costs and fees the district court had already
ordered.

(R., p 105.)

Thus, the district court's discussion of the fact that

State

would bear this cost regardless and the fact that this is just a "routine" drug case reveals
its determination that, given his financial situation, needs,

earning ability, Mr. Harer

not be required to also bear the costs of this prosecution. (See

, pp.105-06.)

This constitutes a reasoned weighing of the relevant factors, and so, is appropriate
within the district court's exercise of its discretion.

(Compare App. Br., p.6 n.2

(demonstrating the State's misunderstanding of the district court's analysis in this
regard).
Finally, the district court considered a third factor which, though not expressly
listed in the statute, was appropriately considered under the catch-all language: "such
other factors as the court deems appropriate." See I.C. § 19-5304(7). Specifically, that

15

§ 37-2732(k) only

in limited

or I

§1

(namely, to

§ 1

§
sees no reason as

to why this case should be treated any differently than most

criminal cases, impliedly noting that defendants in most other criminal cases do not
have to pay the costs of prosecution. (R., p.106.) Therefore, the district court deemed
it appropriate to consider the limited scope of I.C. § 37-2732(k) as a factor weighing
against ordering the relatively-minor amount of restitution requested by the State,
particularly because the State, the party bearing the burden of proof, failed to prove why
such an award was merited on the facts of this particular case. (R., p.105.) Rather, the
district court found, as a matter of fact, that the State "simply provided the hourly rate
and length of time incurred by the deputy prosecutor in doing her job on this case."
, p.105.)

Because the district court found that evidence insufficient to show the
light of its consideration

requested restitution should
factors, it properly denied the

statutory

request for that restitution.

Thus, the district court's decision demonstrates a reasoned analysis of the
statutorily-identified factors.

(See R., pp.105-06.) Therefore, its conclusion that the

State failed to present evidence proving its claim for restitution was justified in this case,
as well as its denial of that motion, constituted a valid exercise of its discretion. Since
State has failed to show an abuse of the district court's discretion on appeal, this
Court should affirm that decision.

16

cou

if

limited the scope of its discretion in its consideration

the State's motion, this

should still affirm its order denying the restitution award because "[w]here the
lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the
order on the correct theory." State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 307 (2014), reh'g denied.
The alternative analysis is premised on the fact that the State's restitution
request included time spent on two cases, including "CR-14-13437 (dismissed)."
, p.93.) Since Mr. Harer was only convicted in one of those cases (see R., pp.74,
79-84), the loss claimed is, ipso facto, not wholly attributable to the conduct for which
Mr. Harer was convicted.

That means, absent an agreement by the parties for

Harer to pay restitution on the dismissed case, the district court lacked statutory
to order the requested restitution. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37 ("It is generally
that courts
reparations or restitution

criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority

direct

a crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such

"); see I.C. § 19-5304(9) ("The

may, with the

of the

order

restitution ... for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not adjudicated or are not
before the court.").
While the district court noted that there was a general agreement

pay

restitution, it also found, as a matter of fact, "[t]here was no agreement as to ... the
amount of restitution." (R., p.102.) That sort of nonspecific agreement does not amount
to an agreement under I.C. § 19-5304(9) to pay restitution for the dismissed conduct.

17

was a general agreement to pay

In

1

or

no

specified economic loss. They also do not express any consent by Nienburg to
restitution that was not proximately caused by his DUI, the offense to which he
guilty."

Id. (emphasis from original omitted).

Thus, the Court held that the

agreement did not establish a valid basis for the district court to award restitution for
losses not caused by the DUI itself.

Id.

As in Nienburg, the district court properly

denied the State's request for restitution because the State failed to carry its prima facie
burden to prove that the restitution it sought was necessary to address the conduct for
which Mr. Harer had been convicted. See id.; Card, 146 Idaho at 114-15.

Furthermore, this case has a more fundamental problem in regard to the
purported agreement, which further demonstrates why this Court should affirm the
court's order denying the restitution request on this alternative ground: the terms
purported agreement do not actually appear in the appellate record.
(See generally R., Tr.)

As the Nienburg Court explained, the authority to order

restitution under such agreements is governed by the plain language of the agreement.
Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 497. Thus, without the language of the agreement, this Court

cannot engage in the requisite analysis.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[e]rror will not be presumed on
appeal, but must be affirmatively shown in the record. The appellant has the burden of
the providing an adequate record on appeal .... " Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805. As such,
"where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to

18

,,

V.

1

1

a

missing portions of the record (namely, the absent terms of the purported
agreement to pay restitution) should be presumed to support the district court's decision
to deny the State's restitution request That means they shouid be presumed to contain
no specific agreement for Mr. Harer to pay restitution for the dismissed charge.
discussed supra, absent such an agreement, the Court was without statutory
authority to grant the State's request for restitution, since it included a claim for
restitution for time spent on charges for which Mr. Harer was not convicted. Nienburg,

153 Idaho at 496-97.
In fact, since the appellate record does not reveal the terms of any relevant terms
5

the district court's determination that there was an agreement to

restitution at all (R., p.102) is not supported by competent and substantial
Therefore, that determination should

aside as clearly erroneous, in which

case, there definitely was not any basis upon which the district court had authority to
grant the State's restitution

or

missing part of the record should,

Mowrey and Coma, be presumed to support the district court's decision to deny the
State's restitution request.

In either case, this Court would properly affirm the district

court's order denying the claim for restitution.

The only term of that agreement actually appearing in the appellate record is the
statement in Mr. Harer's guilty plea questionnaire - that the State will limit its sentencing
recommendation to allow for a period of jurisdiction (R, p.69; see generally R., Tr.)

5
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this Court rules on the State's claim

error in this

on this

CONCLUSION

Mr. Harer respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order denying
the State's request for restitution.
DATED this 281h day of December, 2015.
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